Although I agree that there are benefits in terms of better control of stocks through the use of TACs and ITQs, Mansfield does make a point when he argues that "privatization quotas on their own do nothing to prevent overfishing, while they do much to encourage further consolidation of fishing into the hands of the wealthy and therefore to increase inequality" (sorry, no page reference cause I'm on a Kindle, but is the paragraph before conclusion). In fact one of the problems that I have with ITQs is that when non-selective gears are used, a fishing vessels allocated with quotas on a specific species will likely catch many fish outside its target species and discard them, therefore augmenting the by-catch of other species. It is therefore not enough to just allocate quotas, this must be accompanied with: - Enforcement and regulation over the use of by catch reduction devices; - Accurate information on discard rates and discard mortality (something very few fishermen put in their books) ; - Government support to small traditional fishermen who would otherwise be outside the game if they don't have the initial money to buy the fishing rights....
Mansfield just throws that phrase out of the blue, without any concrete data or examples to show that ITQs --per se-- encourage inequality. To make sure that ITQs are comprehensive, you can take care of non-powerful, small-scale fisheries by grandfathering them. Hence, the problem is not ITQ itself, but the way you design the "first" distribution. Mansfield does not use any data to support his idea that ITQs lead to more technology or bigger vessels. On the contrary, if you set the quota in 10, there will be lots of losers who will be out of business. They will have to reduce their fleet accordingly.
He's not the only one making such claims: - "Under a system of ITQs a concentration of harvesting rights in the hands of fewer operators seems inevitable.... usually at the cost of social equity; it almost always implies an erosion of the small scale family based units and a growth of larger, capitalistic enterprises" (Symes and Crean, 1995, p.181
-..."a siginificant outocme from ITQ allocation..is a reduction in the number of vessels in a fishery; ... the emerging issue is equity and the social impact that may arise" (McPhee 2008, p. 170)
-..."without consideration of distributive justice and legal principles underlying the equitable allocation of property rights, fisheries manager's can face prolonged conflict (McPhee 2008, 175).
Also yet another problem is that many fleets will not just simply be faced out, but rather they might move to fisheries with no ITQs.
A good place to look at the issue of equity in ITQs: http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol15/iss3/art36/
Lit. cited: Symes, D. and Crean, K. (1995) Privatisation of the commons: the introduction of individual transferable quotas in developed fisheries. Geoforum 26(2): 175-185
McPhee, D. (2008) Fisheries Management in Australia, The Federation Press, Sydney.
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ReplyDeleteAlthough I agree that there are benefits in terms of better control of stocks through the use of TACs and ITQs, Mansfield does make a point when he argues that "privatization quotas on their own do nothing to prevent overfishing, while they do much to encourage further consolidation of fishing into the hands of the wealthy and therefore to increase inequality" (sorry, no page reference cause I'm on a Kindle, but is the paragraph before conclusion). In fact one of the problems that I have with ITQs is that when non-selective gears are used, a fishing vessels allocated with quotas on a specific species will likely catch many fish outside its target species and discard them, therefore augmenting the by-catch of other species. It is therefore not enough to just allocate quotas, this must be accompanied with:
ReplyDelete- Enforcement and regulation over the use of by catch reduction devices; - Accurate information on discard rates and discard mortality (something very few fishermen put in their books) ;
- Government support to small traditional fishermen who would otherwise be outside the game if they don't have the initial money to buy the fishing rights....
Mansfield just throws that phrase out of the blue, without any concrete data or examples to show that ITQs --per se-- encourage inequality. To make sure that ITQs are comprehensive, you can take care of non-powerful, small-scale fisheries by grandfathering them. Hence, the problem is not ITQ itself, but the way you design the "first" distribution. Mansfield does not use any data to support his idea that ITQs lead to more technology or bigger vessels. On the contrary, if you set the quota in 10, there will be lots of losers who will be out of business. They will have to reduce their fleet accordingly.
ReplyDeleteHe's not the only one making such claims:
ReplyDelete- "Under a system of ITQs a concentration of harvesting rights in the hands of fewer operators seems inevitable.... usually at the cost of social equity; it almost always implies an erosion of the small scale family based units and a growth of larger, capitalistic enterprises" (Symes and Crean, 1995, p.181
-..."a siginificant outocme from ITQ allocation..is a reduction in the number of vessels in a fishery; ... the emerging issue is equity and the social impact that may arise" (McPhee 2008, p. 170)
-..."without consideration of distributive justice and legal principles underlying the equitable allocation of property rights, fisheries manager's can face prolonged conflict (McPhee 2008, 175).
Also yet another problem is that many fleets will not just simply be faced out, but rather they might move to fisheries with no ITQs.
A good place to look at the issue of equity in ITQs:
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol15/iss3/art36/
Lit. cited:
Symes, D. and Crean, K. (1995) Privatisation of the commons: the introduction of individual transferable quotas in developed fisheries. Geoforum 26(2): 175-185
McPhee, D. (2008) Fisheries Management in Australia, The Federation Press, Sydney.
Love it that you guys are having a debate!
ReplyDelete